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Between Du Châtelet’s Leibniz Exegesis and
Kant’s Early Philosophy: A Study of Their
Responses to the vis viva Controversy
Huaping Lu-Adler, Georgetown University
Abstract
This paper examines Du Châtelet’s and Kant’s responses to the famous vis viva controversy –
Du Châtelet in her Institutions Physiques (1742) and Kant in his debut, the Thoughts on the
True Estimation of Living Forces (1746–49). The Institutions was not only a highly influential
contribution to the vis viva controversy, but also a pioneering attempt to integrate Leibnizian
metaphysics and Newtonian physics. The young Kant’s evident knowledge of this work has
led some to speculate about his indebtedness to her philosophy. My study corrects such
speculations as well as misunderstandings of the Living Forces. This corrective result has
implications for how to investigate Kant’s relation to the ever-evolving landscape of Leibniz
exegeses.
1. Introduction
My goal in this paper is to clarify the relation between Kant’s early philosophy and Émi-
lie Du Châtelet’s work. I do so through a focused examination of their responses to the
famous vis viva controversy – Du Châtelet in her Institutions Physiques (1742, second edi-
tion) and Kant in his first publication, the Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces
(1746–49). The fact that Kant repeatedly mentions Du Châtelet in his debut, coupled
with recent studies of her as an influential and unique voice in the discourse on natural
philosophy during the 1740s, suffices to make us curious.1 There have indeed been spe-
culations about the early Kant’s relation to Du Châtelet, but, as I shall explain shortly, a
more grounded study of that relation is in order.
An important part of this study is to understand what Kant might have sought to
accomplish with the Living Forces, a question that has received competing answers.2
Particularly controversial is how this work relates to what Martin Schönfeld calls Kant’s
“precritical project,” defined by the ambition to find “a coherent philosophy of nature”
and “to integrate Newtonian physics in a comprehensive and speculative framework”
(Schönfeld 2000, 3). To Schönfeld, the Living Forces was not a bona fide part of this
project, even though, as the starting point of Kant’s “precritical philosophy,” it would
1 Kant shows a keen interest in Du Châtelet’s dispute with Jean de Mairan (GSK 1: 45–46, 55, 67–68, 92–93, 130–
133), a well-known episode of the vis viva controversy. I discuss the episode in section 3.
2 See Adickes 1924, 65–144; Cassirer 1981, 26–32; Shell 1996, 10–30; Kuehn 2001, 86–95. I will also mention other
commentaries below.
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“cast a long shadow over Kant’s subsequent endeavors” and lead to the precritical project
as an “indirect consequence” (Schönfeld 2000, 18–19).
When writing his first book, Kant had not yet experienced the Newtonian conversion that would
dominate his thoughts on nature for the rest of his life, and he had not yet given thought to the
grand issues of metaphysics that would govern the precritical project. In this regard, the Living
Forces occupied a position all on its own. (Schönfeld 2000, 18)
To Michael Friedman, by contrast, the Living Forces already “initiates a fundamental phi-
losophical reconsideration of Newtonian physics which is then continued throughout the
so-called pre-critical period.” The purported reconsideration centers on an attempt “to
redefine the nature and method of metaphysics in light of the recent breathtaking advan-
ces in mathematics and mathematical physics” and, especially, “to revise the Leibnizian-
Wolffian monadology in light of Newtonian physics” by, among other things, “import[ing]
Newton’s second law of motion into the very heart of the monadology” (Friedman 1992,
xi, xiii, 5).3
However important it may be to clarify the early Kant’s relation to Newtonian physics,4
it seems problematic to make this a key interpretative concern that determines the place
of the Living Forces in Kant’s philosophical development. For one thing, it is the Cartesi-
an, not Newtonian, physics that gets most of the attention in this text. For another, the
more basic philosophical issue at play concerns the relation between metaphysics and
natural science (physics) in general, regardless of whether one is a committed Newtonian
in the latter area.5 In that connection, we may very well describe Kant’s precritical pro-
ject, as Schönfeld himself does at one point, simply in terms of a “reconciliation of the
perspectives of natural science and metaphysics” (Schönfeld 2000, 17).
Du Châtelet’s Institutions (Foundations), as we shall see, represents an unprecedented
attempt at such a reconciliation. This fact, together with an observation of “the apparent
overlap between topics treated by Du Châtelet and by the early Kant”, has led Katherine
Brading to ponder about the connection between their philosophical outlooks.
Kant’s first publication (1749) was his contribution to the so--called “vis viva controversy”, and this
same topic occupies the final chapters of Du Châtelet’s Foundations as part of a public dispute.
Kant is explicitly continuing this debate. [. . .] Reading on, the similarities seem much deeper
and more important than this. Schönfeld’s (2000, Introduction) description of Kant’s precritical
project could be a description of what Du Châtelet sets out to do in her Foundations. (Brading
2015, 28, n. 33)
While Brading cautiously suggests that “there is much work to be done on the relationship
between Du Châtelet’s Foundations of Physics and Kant’s early philosophy” (Brading 2015,
28, n. 33), Ruth Hagengruber confidently asserts that Kant “dedicated” his debut to Du
3 There is in fact no clear textual basis for bringing up monadology here. Kant mentions monads just once, while
considering whether striving force is “directed toward all regions” or “entirely indeterminate with regard to
direction.” He prefers the latter view, citing G. E. Hamberger’s claim that “the substantial force of monads strives
toward motion equally in all directions” (GSK 1: 26). But Kant does not insist that the substance with striving
force be a monad.
4 The early Kant’s attitude toward Newtonianism may turn out to be more nuanced than how Schönfeld and
Friedman each has portrayed it. See Watkins 2013.
5 I refer to “natural science,” “physics,” and later “mechanics” as though they are interchangeable concepts. Their
differences are tangential to the purpose of this paper.
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Châtelet’s work and even cites Johann A. Eberhard as later accusing him of “copying from
her” – an accusation that would presumably be unsurprising at the time, if Du Châtelet’s
work was indeed treated, “in Germany at least for a certain period,” as “part of the canon”
on natural philosophy (Hagengruber 2015, 39).
My analysis will reveal little, however, to encourage the thought that Kant’s Living
Forces was indebted to Du Châtelet’s work in any philosophically meaningful way. All in
all, Kant’s debut shows far less philosophical ambition in comparisonwith the Institutions,
especially when it comes to reforming Leibnizian metaphysics in light of the advances in
physics at the time.
In what follows, I argue for this reading in three steps. I begin, in section 2, by conside-
ring the vis viva controversy that prompted Kant’s Living Forces. I present the controversy
as a complex affair that implicated all three leading systems of the time, namely Cartesia-
nism, Leibnizianism, and Newtonianism. I do so partly to shed a much-needed new light
on the context of Kant’s first publication, highlighting the opportunity provided thereby
for constructing a philosophical framework to integrate the best elements of the systems
just mentioned.
In section 3, I study how Du Châtelet seized that opportunity and rendered Leibniz’s
metaphysics in such a way that it would not only be essentially compatible with New-
tonianism but also underscore a most advantageous scientific methodology. My study
centers on Du Châtelet’s treatment, contra her partner Voltaire’s, of the Principle of Suf-
ficient Reason. Working from different interpretations of Leibnizian metaphysics, these
two committed Newtonians would arrive at opposite conclusions about its relation to
Newtonian physics.
In section 4, I look at Kant’s attempt to resolve the vis viva controversy, giving special
attention to his sundry remarks about (Leibniz’s) metaphysics. I then compare his and
Du Châtelet’s responses to the opportunity of philosophical reform presented by the
controversy. The comparison will show that the young Kant’s philosophical vision was
much narrower than Du Châtelet’s.
I then conclude by pointing out the implication of my study for a broader interpreta-
tive project in which one examines how Kant’s philosophical developments might have
interacted with the ever-evolving history of Leibniz exegeses.
2. The vis viva controversy and the struggles to make
metaphysics (ir)relevant to physics
Kant saw the vis viva controversy as one of the greatest disputes that divided European
thinkers (GSK 1: 16). Some commentators believe that the controversy virtually ended
with Jean d’Alembert’s Traité de Dynamique (1743). Kant’s first publication is therefore
under-informed and “bookish” (Polonoff 1973, 6) or, worse still, a “false start” and “tho-
rough embarrassment” partly because “d’Alembert had already published a theory that
effectively settled the debate three years before Kant turned his mind to it” (Schönfeld
2000, 18).
From the eighteenth-century point of view, however, d’Alembert’s Traité did not have
the effect of settling the debate in 1743. Leonhard Euler’s “De la force de percussion
et de sa véritable mesure,” published in 1746 after being presented (in Latin) to the
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Berlin Academy in 1744, was just one among many indications that the dispute remained
“unresolved and hotly contested” (Laudan 1968, 132; also Hankins 1965 and Iltis 1970).
More importantly, by then it had become clear that the controversy was never simply a
technical one about how to measure force. Rather, implicated therein were also some
of the most important and most divisive philosophical issues concerning physics – viz.
what must be assumed about bodies (e. g. hardness) in order for certain laws of physics
to be applicable, the relation between force and motion, God’s role in natural order, and
scientific methodology. Debates on this last issue will in turn bring into sharp relief the
need tomanage the relation betweenmetaphysics and physics and, for Leibniz’s followers
in particular, to clarify his position on this subject.
My following sketch of certain events pertaining to the vis viva controversy is meant to
accentuate some of the philosophical issues just mentioned.
Leibniz initiated the controversy in a series of publications on Cartesian mechanics.
On the surface, it was about whether the “force” of a body in motion should be measured
bymv, as the Cartesians did, or bymv2. At its root, however, this controversy was not just
a mathematical dispute over the correct estimation of force but, as Carolyn Iltis puts it, “a
fundamental disagreement as to the very nature of force itself,” with Leibniz attacking
the Cartesian conception thereof as an “inadequate [. . .] description of the world” (Iltis
1971, 23, 32). An overview of the relevant texts will show that the disagreement went even
deeper, reaching the point where a defender of either the Cartesian or the Leibnizian
position would have to take a stance about whether metaphysical considerations are
relevant to mechanics.
At the center of Leibniz’s polemic against Cartesian mechanics is the law of conserva-
tion. The two sides agree on the principle that motive force must be conserved in nature,
but disagree over the nature and measurement of this force. While the Cartesians equate
it to the quantity of local motion and measure it just like the latter, namely by “the pro-
duct of the body and its velocity [mv],” Leibniz sees a “big difference” between the two, so
that “the one cannot be calculated by the other.” The forces that are conserved after the
collision of two bodies with equal mass, he argues, “are proportional not to their velocities
but [. . . ] to the squares of their velocities.” That is, the conserved force in such cases must
bemv2. After providing a mathematical demonstration for this law of conservation and
placing it “among the immutable foundations of the science of mechanics,” Leibniz adds:
the “ultimate reason” for this result is that “motion is not something absolute and real in
itself” (PPL 296–297, 299–301).
This remark points to a key difference between the Leibnizian and Cartesian brands of
mechanics: they presuppose radically different metaphysical outlooks, especially concer-
ning the nature of body in motion and the laws governing all corporeal motions.
In Descartes’s metaphysics, motion has a twofold cause. The primary and “general
cause” of all motions is God, who on account of his immutability and by “regular con-
currence” conserves their total quantity. Meanwhile, each motion has a motive force,
as “the particular cause which produces in an individual piece of matter some motion
which it previously lacked” in accordance with the three laws of motion that follow from
God’s immutability. Conceptually, then, motive force does differ from the motion caused
thereby: the transfer of a body from one place to another is “opposed to the force or action
which brings about the transfer.” Descartes prefers, however, to study motion without
considering motive force. When he does talk about the latter, he does so in terms of its
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effect and takes it to consist “simply in the fact that everything tends, so far as it can, to
persist in the same state” according to the first law of motion (Descartes 1985, 216; 233;
240; 243).
When Descartes speaks of laws of nature, he limits “nature” to matter, as mere extensi-
on, along with its qualities. In his view, the only “clear and distinct notions” we can obtain
regarding the relevant corporeal qualities are those of shape, size, and motion, which
are modified strictly in accordance with “the principles of geometry and mechanics.”
In that connection, laws of nature are none other than laws of motion and enjoy the
same kind of necessity as geometrical principles do, as they “follow inevitably from the
eternal truths on which mathematicians have usually based their most certain and most
evident demonstrations [. . . and] according to which God himself has taught us that he
has arranged all things in number, weight and measure” (Descartes 1985, 92; 97; 288).
Leibniz makes a decisive break with this Cartesian view in his “Specimen Dynamicum”
(1695), arguing that “in corporeal nature besides the object of geometry, or extension,”
there is also force. This force is either active or passive, and each of these is in turn
either primitive or derivative. Primitive active force, as the “substantial form” or “first
entelechy” of bodies, inheres “in all corporeal substance as such.” Primitive passive force,
constituting the materia prima of bodies, represents their endowed capacity to resist
penetration and motion. A derivative force is either a “dead force,” as mere “solicitation
to motion” without actual motion, or a “living force,” which is “ordinary force combined
with actual motion.” It is by these derivative forces that “bodies actually act and are acted
upon by each another.” They alone are directly connected to determinate motions, in
terms of which wemust give specific causal explanations of all other material phenomena
in accordance with laws of nature (PPL 436–438).
As for primitive forces, though insufficient “to explain the phenomena,” they are “ne-
cessary [. . . ] for philosophizing rightly.” Absurd consequences follow, Leibniz contends, if
we understand bodies “in mathematical terms only” and strictly in accordance with “the
bare laws of motion derived from pure geometry,” without any recourse to “metaphysical
notions such as active power in form, or of passive power and resistance to motion in
matter.” To avoid such consequences, we must also consider forces, as something inherent
in bodies, and the relevant “metaphysical laws.” Only then will we have an adequate basis,
which goes beyond “logical and geometrical axioms alone,” for determining truths about
the corporeal nature, including the aforementioned law of conservation (PPL 436, 440–
441).
Leibniz takes himself to have thereby found a middle ground between philosophers
who invoke an active principle directly to explain natural phenomena and the ones
whose view of nature leaves no place for any metaphysical consideration whatsoever.
His strategy is to distinguish “immediate and particular efficient causes of natural things”
and “the first and most universal efficient cause” (e. g. first entelechy), which pertain
to mechanical laws and metaphysical reasons respectively. Although “mechanical laws
are themselves to be derived in general from higher [metaphysical] reasons,” we must
explain all specific corporeal phenomena in purely mechanistic terms (PPL 441).
Now we turn to Newton. Although he did not explicitly reject vis viva in his publicati-
ons, the rejection was widely perceived as implied – hence Du Châtelet’s impression that
Newton “did not acknowledge forces vives, for the name of M. Newton is in itself nearly
an objection” (FP 199). With the caveat that there is more in Newton’s writings that bears
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on aspects of the vis viva controversy – especially on the relationship between forces and
motions – than I can delve into here,6 I shall focus on remarks that are suggestive of his
general scientific methodology and view on the relation between metaphysics and phy-
sics, so as to pave the way for my later analyses of Voltaire’s and Du Châtelet’s positions
on these subjects.7
At the beginning of his Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (first published
in 1687; the third edition [1726; 1999] is used), Newton states: the quantity of motion is
the product of quantity of matter and its velocity; by the “inherent force of matter,” vis
inertiae, a body will remain at rest or in uniform motion along a straight line unless a
motive force is impressed on it to alter that state; this force is proportional to the motion
generated thereby in a given time (Newton 1999, 404–405; 407). But vis inertiae, as a
merely passive force, can by itself neither bring about any motion nor preserve the same
quantity of motion in the world. Newton therefore sees the need to introduce “active
principles.” He says in the queries to the Opticks (first edition in 1704; the fourth edition
[1730] is used): “the variety of Motion which we find in the World is always decreasing,
[and so] there is a necessity of conserving and recruiting it by active Principles such as are
the cause of Gravity” (Newton 1730, 375). While recognizing that “we meet with very little
Motion in the World, besides what is owing to these active Principles,” Newton claims no
knowledge about their causal mechanisms. He might stress one thing, though: they are far
from Leibniz’s active forces. While the latter belong in Leibniz’s metaphysical category
of primitive forces, Newton’s active principles are part of his physics. He considers these
“not as occult Qualities, supposed to result from specific Forms of Things, but as general
Laws of Nature, by which the Things themselves are form’d.” Their reality is proven not
through metaphysical reasoning, but by their “manifest Effects” (Newton 1730, 375–377).
Having nothing more to say about the active principles in question does not bother
Newton. In his opinion, it suffices for a universal physics that he has discovered the
“impenetrability, mobility, and impetus of bodies, and the laws of motion and the law of
gravity” and shown that “gravity really exists and acts according to the laws that we have
set forth and is sufficient to explain all the motions of the heavenly bodies and of our sea.”
Following the dictates of “rules for the study of natural philosophy,” especially the rule
of admitting “no more causes of natural things [. . .] than are both true and sufficient to
explain their phenomena,” Newton refrains from feigning hypotheses about the causal
grounds of gravitational forces, hypotheses being whatever are “not deduced from the
phenomena” (Newton 1999, 794, 943).
As an example of this refrain, while stating that “the small Particles of Bodies [have]
certain Powers, Virtues, or Forces, by which they act at a distance [. . .] upon one another
for producing a great Part of the Phænomena of Nature” (this is part of the theory of
universal gravitation), Newton professes no insight into how the gravitational forces may
be performed – be it “by impulse, or by some other means unknown to me.” Accordingly,
he resigns himself to using ‘attraction’ to “signify only in general any Force by which
Bodies tend towards one another, whatsoever be the Cause,” and studying from natural
6 For a brief but helpful account of Newton’s complicated relation to the vis viva controversy, see Smith 2006, 35.
On Newton’s treatments of forces, see Janiak 2008, 50–86.
7 For a more extensive and nuanced discussion of Newton’s views on the relation between metaphysics and
physics, see Janiak 2008, 11–49; 163–78.
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phenomena “what Bodies attract one another, and what are the Laws and Properties of
the Attraction” (Newton 1730, 350–351).
Fast forwarding to 1740s, we can see one reason as to why d’Alembert was in no position
to end the vis viva controversy with his Traité. The preface to this treatise suggests a
narrow, one-sided interest in mechanics as a (Cartesian) mathematical science, coupled
with an eagerness to dodge metaphysical queries altogether. Mechanics owes its certainty
to the “simplicity” of its object, he claims, namely “motion and its general properties.” If
force may be intelligibly considered as one such property, it can only be “the quantity of
motion” (mv). For we can have “no precise and distinct idea for the word ‘force’” except by
“restricting this term to express an effect,” the effect being motion. Otherwise, the whole
question of the measurement of force would come down to “a very futile metaphysical
discussion” or, worse still, “a dispute of words (une dispute de mots).” For this reason,
d’Alembert circumscribes “motive causes” and considers only the observable phenomena
of motion produced thereby. He in fact “proscribe[s] entirely the forces inherent to the
body in motion, obscure and metaphysical beings that can only strew darkness over a
science clear by itself.” While feeling obliged to mention the accounts of motive cause
by Leibniz and “a lady illustrious for her genius” (Du Châtelet), d’Alembert is abundantly
clear in its “perfect uselessness for mechanics.” For mechanics is “more a science of effects
than that of causes” (D’Alembert 1743, i, v, xvi–xvii, xix, xxi, xxiii).
D’Alembert’s offhand dismissal of metaphysics begs the very question about its relation
to physics that was implicated in the vis viva controversy from the start. Nor could his oft-
cited phrase ‘une dispute de mots’ serve to simplify the controversy. This phrase, as An-
drea Reichenberger has shown, had already been “widely-used” to portray the controversy
as a “semantic dispute” without, however, thereby reducing it to “a pointless quibble over
semantics.” The query about the nature of force or other related metaphysical issues did
not and would not go away just because some found it inessential to mechanics. Rather,
the protraction of the vis viva controversy suggests a need to scrutinize the metaphysics
of the three leading natural philosophies of the day – the Cartesian, the Leibnizian, and
the Newtonian (Reichenberger 2012, 158–59).8
Thus, the vis viva controversy left its participants in the 1740s with an excellent op-
portunity to think deeply and systematically about the philosophical issues implicated
therein. Du Châtelet would rise to this occasion as an independent, visionary thinker.
3. Between Leibnizian metaphysics and Newtonian physics:
Du Châtelet contra Voltaire
In 1741, an exchange took place between Du Châtelet and Jean de Mairan, then secretary
of the Paris Academy. The exchange included De Mairan’s response to Du Châtelet’s cri-
ticism of his anti-Leibnizian arguments about force and her point-by-point rebuttal. Both
documents were appended to the 1742 edition of her Institutions and its German trans-
8 Reichenberger also thinks “the common categorization between the Cartesian, Leibnizian and Newtonian
school is oversimplified,” though, as can be shown from a “deeper look at the [vis viva] controversy” (Reichen-
berger 2012, 160). Part of what would complicate the matter, as she goes on to show, was Du Châtelet’s attempt
to combine Newtonianism and Leibnizianism.
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lation (1743). Details of Du Châtelet’s treatment of the vis viva controversy (in the final
chapter of the Institutions) aside, what intrigues me is Reichenberger’s following charac-
terization of her conciliatory approach, she carried out “a reformation of metaphysics
as science” to provide the framework for integrating Leibnizian and Newtonian sides of
the controversy. More specifically, Du Châtelet’s plan was to integrate “Leibniz’s vis viva
theory into Newtonian mechanics” (Reichenberger 2012, 158). I defer to Reichenberger’s
analysis for how this specific integration works and how a reformed metaphysics is sup-
posed to ensure its feasibility. In what follows, I consider only Du Châtelet’s philosophical
framework in its broad strokes, insofar as it is to bring Leibnizianism and Newtonianism
together.9
We saw earlier that Newton had little to say about the cause of attraction besides cal-
ling it an “active principle” and inferring its reality from manifest phenomena. What was
to him a disciplined refrain from feigning hypotheses about this principle would, howe-
ver, be viewed by many as a reason to reject his theory of universal gravitation. According
to Judith Zinsser, Du Châtelet’s Institutions was to address this “principal weakness”
of Newton’s theory in a way that her fellow Newtonians – including Voltaire, who po-
pularized Newtonianism with his Elémens de la philosophie de Newton (1741, expanded
edition) – had failed to do.10 That is, it would offer “metaphysical, causal explanations for
the phenomenon of attraction, how and why it worked as it did” and do so by “giv[ing]
Newtonian mechanics the metaphysical foundations the Englishman had failed to sort
out” (Zinsser 2009, 105).
A different picture emerges, however, if we take a closer look at Voltaire’s defense of
Newton and then read the Institutions in that connection. The disagreement between
the two Newtonians runs deeper than Zinsser suggested, especially over the following
questions. First, how far should we go inquiring about the causal grounds of natural
phenomena? Second, how are we to interpret Leibniz’s metaphysics and its supposed
relevance to physics? Third, more generally speaking, what counts as a proper “metaphy-
sics” for physics and how are we to adjudicate between competing versions thereof?
On Voltaire’s part, he defends Newton’s system against its Cartesian and Leibnizian
critics respectively. He has a ready answer to the Cartesians: we are equally ignorant
about the cause of Cartesian impulsion and that of Newtonian attraction. If the latter,
as a “universal property” of matter, is dismissed as an “occult quality” in the sense of
being a “real principle for which no reason can be given,” impulsion fares no better in this
regard. Still, there is a sense in which attraction is not occult, i. e. not chimerical: Newton
established it “by the most sublime and most exact mathematical demonstrations.” All
things considered, then, we must be content with his discovery of “this visible attraction
for which neither he nor any other philosopher could find the reason” (Voltaire 1741, 185–
188).
A Leibnizian would criticize this contentment for violating the Principle of Sufficient
Reason (PSR), by which we must “penetrate as far as possible into the heart of the causes.”
Voltaire responds by denying PSR of its normative claim here. This principle, he contends,
9 I follow a common narrative in referring to Du Châtelet’s plan of merging Leibnizianism and Newtonianism. See
Barber 1967, Hutton 2004, and Hagengruber 2012b, which represent varying accounts of Du Châtelet’s relations
to Leibnizianism and Newtonianism respectively.
10 The 1741 edition of Voltaire’s Elémens has a newly added part on metaphysics.
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cannot take us as far as it pretends to in our causal inquiries. Monadology is a case in
point, which resulted from Leibniz’s quest for the sufficient cause of extended beings, a
cause that must be other than extension (to avoid circular explanation). Taking Leibniz’s
view to be that extended beings are literally “composed” of simple monads, Voltaire
dismisses it as contradictory and absurd. Can one posit, he asks rhetorically, that “a drop
of urine is an infinity of monads and that each of them has ideas, however obscure,
of the entire universe”? Leibniz’s system is but a product of “sheer imagination,” then,
in the labyrinth of which one wonders off following the thread of PSR only to “march
methodically towards error” (Voltaire 1741, 62–65).
Overall, Voltaire portrays Leibniz and Newton as having oppositemethods for causal
inquiries. Leibniz is said to have followed the dictate of PSR to investigate real causes
for such phenomena as bodily motions and mind-body union – but to no avail. What
has Leibniz “proved,” Voltaire asks, “by all these new efforts?” – That he had “a great
genius,” for sure. But had he thereby “enlightened” anyone? Newton, by contrast, at least
knew “how to doubt” and “hardly ever formed a judgment that was not founded on
either mathematical evidence or experience.” His method of analysis, by which general
conclusions are induced and tested on none other than experiential basis, is the only one
appropriate for us to reason about objects in nature, while knowledge from first principles
pertains strictly to God (Voltaire 1741, 21–25, 45–52; see Newton 1730, 380).
As for Du Châtelet, she sees physics as an edifice that requires collective effort for
its sound construction: while some lay the “foundations [. . .] by means of geometry
and observations,” others, including her, “survey the plan of the building.” Her plan,
as is often understood, is to put Newtonian physics on a proper metaphysical footing.
Accordingly, she begins the Institutions with an exposition of core elements of Leibnizian
metaphysics and gives PSR the central place, with which Leibniz is said to have “provided
a compass capable of leading us in the moving sands of this science” (FP 123). To counter
Voltaire’s anti-Leibnizian rhetoric, she must make clear that the metaphysics she is about
to expound is not meant to indulge our runaway imagination but rather to guide our
intellect in an ongoing quest to penetrate phenomena. She must also explain, or at least
indicate, what constitutes a true metaphysics for physics and how to establish it as such.
It is worth adding here that “metaphysics” was a shifty notion in the eighteenth century.
On the original Aristotelian account, metaphysics is first philosophy in that it studies
the first causes and first principles of things. In Wolff’s Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia
(1736), only ontology or general metaphysics (as opposed to special metaphysics) is first
philosophy properly so called. As a science of being qua being, it supplies immutable
principles to all other sciences insofar as they are to be treated demonstratively (aka.
scientifically).11 Presumably, Du Châtelet was familiar with that conceptual scheme (she
read Wolff’s Ontologia), and Voltaire would deny the possibility of a general metaphysics
while allowing there to be some kind of special metaphysics for physics.
11 PP, Prœfatio; Prolegomena, §§ 1–9. See Lu-Adler 2018 for a relevant account of Wolff’s – as well as Kant’s –
relation to “ontology,” a seventeenth-century invention. Wolff’s special metaphysics includes cosmology, psy-
chology, and natural theology. I will not use ‘special metaphysics’ in Wolff’s limited sense, though. Rather, as
it will become clear shortly, I am using this term in the loose sense of a metaphysics for a special domain of
inquiry.
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To be specific, Voltaire’s intention in the metaphysics part of the Elémens is to compare
Newton’s metaphysics with Leibniz’s and show that the former alone is valid (Voltaire
1741, 73). This comparison presupposes that physics has its own metaphysics, although
there may be good and bad versions thereof. This presupposition would eventually find its
articulation in the popular Encyclopédie edited by d’Alembert and Denis Diderot. In the
unassigned entry “Métaphysique,” metaphysis is identified as “the science of the reasons
of things.” In this sense, “everything has a metaphysics” or, to borrow the terminology just
introduced, there is a special metaphysics for any given science. There is no acknowled-
gement of general metaphysics, though, which would have to abstract from differences
among various domains of inquiries and study being qua being. In fact, a metaphysics is
“despicable” if it consists in “empty and abstract considerations about time, space, matter,
and spirit.” It is altogether different, however, if considered “from its true point of view”
(D’Alembert & Diderot 1765, 440). What this true point of view may be, the entry does not
say. Presumably, what differentiates a good or true metaphysics from a bad or false one is
not so much whether it treats subjects like space and time as how it treats them. Voltaire’s
comparison of Descartes and Newton helps to illustrate this point: while the two share
an account of “the first principles of matter” according to which there is an indifferent
and uniform primary matter, Newton arrived at this system in a different way than Des-
cartes did – not from abstract metaphysical principles, but on strictly mathematical and
experiential grounds (Voltaire 1741, 50–51).
Notably, the first chapter of Du Châtelet’s Institutions is on principles. Insofar as every
science, being an interconnected system of knowledge, has “first principles” on which
other truths depend, she argues, it is important to be “attentive to principles, and the
manner in which truths result from them” (FP 124–125). It is not obvious what is meant
by ‘principle’ here. As a then-standard practice, one could use this term to signify both
things and propositions. For instance, by Kirsten Walsh’s analysis, the foundational prin-
ciples of Newton’s system include both “ontic-principles,” which are “powers, forces, or
dispositions that function as causes of phenomena” and are “foundational” due to this
causal primacy, and “propositional-principles,” which are foundational as premises for
the demonstration of other propositions (Walsh 2017, 196, 200). Voltaire’s reference to
“the first principles of matter” was to ontic-principles. Du Châtelet also seems to have
such principles in mind when, in a later chapter on the elements of matter, she talks
about “the first principles of things” and refers to force as a principle of action (FP 168,
173).
But the absolutely first principles – first not just relative to a specific science – intro-
duced in chapter one of the Institutions seem to be neither ontic nor propositional in
Walsh’s sense. They have three related characteristics. First, they are principles of human
cognition (connaissance), as the title of the chapter suggests. Second, they are “self-evi-
dent.” Third, they are universal, in that we all “naturally follow” them in reasoning. There
are two such principles: the principle of contradiction as the principle of all necessary
truths, and PSR as that of all contingent truths. While geometry depends only on the
former, natural sciences depend on PSR. Certain principles about nature follow from
PSR. One is the principle of indiscernibles, which in turn “banishes from the universe
all similar matter.” (Recall Voltaire’s claim about primary matter being uniform.) The
other is the principle of continuity, which is “one of the most fruitful in physics” as in, for
example, theorizing about optical phenomena, discovering and demonstrating “true laws
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of motion,” and determining whether there are perfectly hard bodies in nature (FP 124,
128–138).
These foundational principles are unmistakably Leibnizian. Unlike Voltaire, Du Châte-
let does not treat their application to physics as a matter of reasoning from first principles.
They do not figure as premises in deductive inferences about natural phenomena. Rather,
they seem to serve the following functions. First, they provide standards for determi-
ning a special metaphysics for physics, which treats ontic-principles that are specific to
physics, such as those of body and motion. (Du Châtelet’s remark about the principle of
indiscernibles suggested this function.) Second, they limit what kind of hypotheses we
can seriously entertain about possible causes of certain phenomena before subjecting
them to experimental tests. Third, they (especially PSR) determine the boundaries of
physics as a causal-explanatory science of natural phenomena. I shall briefly explain the
last two, again by way of contrasting Du Châtelet’s approach with Voltaire’s.
In Voltaire’s view, the only knowable cause of gravitation is God. Even then, we can
only say that He is the cause, not how He has made gravitation work or why it works in
such and such ways. For God created the universe and directs its course with “absolute
liberty” and no particular reason. If one protests that “we must not resort to God in
philosophy,” this principle is valid, Voltaire claims, only with respect to “things that must
be explained by proximate physical causes” (Voltaire 1741, 6–7, 134; also 21–25).
Du Châtelet disagrees. To her, physics is an unceasing human effort to gain an ever
deeper understanding of nature. We are still in this science, she notes, “like this man blind
from birth whose sight Chiselden restored.” The time may “never come entirely” that we
see things with clarity, for “there are probably some truths not made to be perceived by
the eyes of our mind.” But this limitation cannot and should not stop us from always
trying to learn more and penetrate further. If physics is, as it were, “made for man” as a
science that “turns upon the things that constantly surround us,” the human mind – with
PSR as a natural principle by which we inquire about contingent matters – will not rest
content until it finds a cause that contains “the sufficient reason for” the phenomena,
namely the reason that “makes it possible for an intelligent being to understand why”
they are the way they are (FP 116, 120, 131).
More often than not, the requisite causal explanation can neither be straightforwardly
induced from the empirical data at hand nor be deduced from already ascertained prin-
ciples. The proper course to take is not to halt the inquiry by citing, as Voltaire did, our
inability to be thoroughly certain about the true causes of natural phenomena. Rather,
“one is obliged to be content with probable reasons to explain them.” That is, one must
“frame hypotheses to explain the phenomena, the cause of which cannot be discovered
either by experiment or by demonstration.” Hypotheses are essential to scientific progress
in such cases. We just have to use them well, by making sure to develop our hypotheses
in a methodical manner, so that they are (i) in line with PSR and other foundational
principles identified so far, (ii) adequately informed by the relevant facts that we already
know and by an analysis of the explanandum, and (iii) amenable to experimental tests,
by which we can determine their degrees of probability (FP 147–149, 151).
This account of scientific methodology gives a new significance to Newton’s refrain
from speculating about the cause of gravitation. While Voltaire took it to suggest that,
in principle, physics can only go so far in its causal inquiries, Du Châtelet has a different
lesson to draw. To her, physics is a process of human endeavor that neither begins nor
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ends with Newton. If he made important discoveries about gravitation based on the path-
breaking work done by his predecessors (especially in astronomy), ensuing generations of
researchers must pick up where he left off. For everyone involved, successful discoveries
come only from the audacity to conduct difficult inquiries with informed hypotheses,
even if at times, when compelled by experimental evidence, one may have to abandon
them and start all over again. For, in “seek[ing] the reason for [a phenomenon] by means
of hypotheses, [. . .] the efforts made to find the truth are always glorious, even though
they might be fruitless” (FP 152). In these terms, although there is no guarantee that we
will ever identify the true cause of Newtonian attraction, we must still look for the most
probable candidate through rigorous applications of the method of hypothesis.
Here we have a case of how to make a principle of Leibniz’s metaphysics, PSR, perti-
nent to physics without affecting its status as a system of purely physical explanations
(that is, no general-metaphysical principles play any direct explanatory role therein).
Du Châtelet’s rendering of the principle may be seen as part of a considered apology for
Leibniz’s metaphysics. Having situated it in the polemic context defined by Voltaire’s
anti-Leibnizian rhetoric, I am skeptical about an old portrait that attributes her integrati-
on of Leibnizianism and Newtonianism partly to her being “less critical and more easily
attracted [than Voltaire was] by speculative theorising.” Nor does it seem fair to treat
her Institutions as just another example of “the difficulty [. . .] of establishing [within the
context of eighteenth-century rationalism] any clear frontier between scientific know-
ledge and philosophical speculation” (Barber 1967, 209, 222). She in fact problematized,
to say the least, the assumption that “philosophical speculation” – often an unflattering
reference to metaphysical consideration – was so irrelevant to scientific inquiries that
one must break free from it while pursuing scientific knowledge. On her reading, a Leib-
nizian principle like PSR points to a fundamental feature of human reason. This principle
drives scientific progress, as it naturally propels us to seek sufficient-causal explanations
of phenomena and do so indefinitely (since we can never be sure about having reached
the end). Du Châtelet’s concern was only to rein in undisciplined exercises of this natural
tendency by a proper method of hypothesis, which requires that the causal-explanatory
inquiries proceed in lockstep with suitably designed experiments.
By this analysis, Du Châtelet’s Leibniz exegesis partially resembles the mature Kant’s
self-proclaimed “true apology” for Leibniz’s metaphysics, according to which PSR is not a
principle “construed objectively (as a natural law),” but “a merely subjective one, having
reference only to a critique of reason” (ÜE [1790], 8: 247–248, 250).12 This resemblance,
besides the fact that the early Kant evidently took interest in the Institutions, makes one
wonder whether his philosophical outlook was somewhat inspired by Du Châtelet’s. We
shall have a rough answer to this question after an overview of Kant’s remarks about
(Leibniz’s) metaphysics in his first publication.
12 Kant characterizes PSR as one of the “three peculiarities” of Leibniz’s metaphysics, the other two being Mona-
dology and the doctrine of pre-established harmony (ÜE 8: 247).
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4. Kant’s treatment of (Leibniz’s) metaphysics in the Living Forces
Kant’s Living Forces exhibits a conciliatory, independent-minded posture similar to Du
Châtelet’s. In the name of “the freedom of human understanding,” he ventures “to think
nothing of the reputation of a Newton and a Leibniz, if it should oppose the discovery of
truth, and to obey no persuasions other than the force of the understanding.” He portrays
the vis viva controversy as an internal conflict of human reason “embodied differently in
astute men.” To resolve it is then to “reconcile reason with itself [. . . ] and to find the truth,
which is never wholly missed by reason’s thoroughness (Gründlichkeit)” and requires
only “a little absence of partisanship, and a brief balance of one’s intellectual inclinations”
(GSK 1: 7–8, 149, 181).
This attitude shapes how Kant deals with Leibniz’s metaphysics in the three-chapter
treatise. In chapter one (GSK §§ 1–19), Kant indicates his support for the core tenets of the
Leibnizian doctrine of living forces – that they are real, conserved in a physically interac-
ting world, and measured bymv2 – and the basic metaphysical framework presupposed
thereby. But he also finds it necessary to modify the doctrine to make it “certain and defi-
nitive.” To this end, he begins by clarifying the “metaphysical concepts” of force. He takes
there to be an active force as such (vim activam überhaupt), an essential metaphysical
force that inheres in a body and is the origin of all its motions (GSK 1: 17–19).13 He then
divides all corporeal motions into two kinds. The first, “free” motion, “has the property of
conserving itself in the body to which it is communicated, and of persisting infinitely if no
impediment opposes it.” The force expressed therein must then be a living force, as “an
internal source of an intrinsically imperishable force that performs its action over time.”
The second kind of motion requires only an external, dead force and “disappears as soon
as this force ceases to sustain it.” This distinction differs from the original Leibnizian one:
while the latter was cast in terms of whether motion is actualized (see section 2 above),
Kant views the absence or involvement of actual motion as inessential and intends his
new distinction to serve for his “main purpose of improving on the Leibnizian measure of
force” (GSK 1: 28–30; see 1: 33–39).
Kant ends chapter one by noting that “our metaphysics is [. . . ] only on the threshold of
a properly founded cognition (Erkenntniß)” and that a “merely metaphysical” contem-
plation cannot promise anything decisive or irrefutable. So, he decides to take a lengthy
mathematical excursion in chapter two (GSK §§ 20–113) to examine the representative
proofs that the Leibnizians so far have constructed for the doctrine of living force. This
examination, Kant hopes, “may perhaps, through the application of mathematics, have
more claim to persuasion” (1: 30, modified translation).
Kant thereby signals a degree of sensitivity to the kind of anti-metaphysics sentiment
that we saw earlier in d’Alembert’s disparaging reference to “futile metaphysical” con-
siderations about force. As Kant subsequently puts it, the ‘Naturlehrer’ of the day could
reject a view simply for having a “metaphysical” basis (GSK 1: 61). Accordingly, while
deeming it “evident that the very first sources of nature’s operations definitely have to be
13 I translate “überhaupt” as “as such” to reflect Leibniz’s conception of active force as “force in the absolute
sense,” a primitive power that “endures in each and every corporeal substance.” A derivative force is an alterable
modification of the primitive one (PE 252, 254). Kant follows Leibniz in treating active force as metaphysically
prior to living force.
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a subject of metaphysics,” he stands ready to offer “a method to please those who mistrust
anything that has even the appearance of metaphysics and who consistently insist on
experience as the ground of conclusions.” That is, he seeks to demonstrate the reality
of living forces and its correct estimation from experiments and observations and do so
“with mathematical precision” (GSK 1: 150; see 1: 176–179).
The application of a proper method is key to Kant’s search for an “intermediate position
which concedes that both parties [the Cartesians and the Leibnizians] are to some extent
right” (GSK 1: 32). This method promises to resolve the vis viva controversy by revealing
so-far-hidden errors on both sides:
[it] allows one to decide in each case, by a general consideration of the principles on which a
certain opinion is built and by a comparison of this opinion with the implications drawn from
those principles, whether the nature of the premises really contains everything that the doctrines
that are drawn as conclusions require. (GSK 1: 93)
In short, by this method Kant is to investigate whether the principles /premises of a proof
are “sufficient and complete for the conclusion” that it is constructed to establish (GSK
1: 97).14
Kant’s investigation reveals to him that the Cartesians and Leibnizians presupposed
different conceptions in proving their respective theories about how to estimate force.
Explicating those conceptions and their implications is Kant’s focus in chapter three
(GSK §§ 114–163). He drives a wedge between mathematics and nature, which allows
him to expel living forces from mathematics only to admit them into nature and to show
that, while mv is the only true measurement of force in mathematics, mv2 alone is true
of force in nature. The possibility of this resolution comes from a distinction between
mathematical and natural bodies:
mathematics defines its concept of body by means of Axiomatum, requiring of them that they be
presupposed in its body, even though they actually prohibit and exclude certain properties from
it, properties that are still necessarily found in bodies in nature; hence a body in mathematics is
a thing utterly distinct from a body in nature, and something can therefore be true of the latter
that still does not belong to the former. (GSK 1: 139–140)
Force is the differentiating property: while “mathematics admits force in the body only
insofar as force was caused in it from the outside,” namely a dead force (mv), a body in
nature has “an altogether different constitution.” This body has a living force, whereby it
“bases its motion sufficiently on itself” and “will, on its own, preserve the motion that it
has, freely, permanently, undiminished, and to infinity.” This force cannot be produced
by an external cause but must “acquire determinations pertaining to the measure by the
square from the inner source of the body’s natural force.” That is, it must bemv2 (GSK 1:
140, 143–145).
Finally, just as Kant began chapter one with a measured endorsement of Leibniz’s
metaphysics of nature, so does he conclude chapter three with an expression of indeb-
tedness to Leibniz’s groundbreaking work in this area. “I could have done nothing,” he
professes, “without the guiding thread of the splendid law of continuity, [. . . ] which was
14 It is unclear whether this method is of the same kind as the one I mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
Commentators have given radically different assessments of the significance of Kant’s references to “method”
in the Living Forces (see Cassirer 1981, 27–28; Polonoff 1973, 60).
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the only tool for finding the exit from this labyrinth” (GSK 1: 181). There is no room here
to examine how the law of continuity might have helped Kant to find his way through
the vis viva controversy (see 1: 37, 105, 145–146, 155–156, 166), to assess the quality of his
mathematical arguments,15 to see whether he has actually succeeded to resolve the con-
troversy (most historians would say no), or to determine the degree of his adherence to
Leibniz’s metaphysics (see Schönfeld 2000, 41–42).
Now I return to the question about Kant’s connection to Du Châtelet. Notably, in the
Living Forces, the only one of Kant’s pre-critical publications that contains references to
Du Châtelet’s work, she figures primarily as a mathematical scientist taking Leibniz’s side
of the vis viva debate. How Kant views the rest of her Institutions is hard to tell. If I was
right to observe, at the end of section 3, a certain resemblance between Du Châtelet’s
treatment of PSR and how Kant would interpret it several decades later, the Kant of the
1740s seems to have little to offer on this subject. And, while he shares her view that
the principle of continuity is one of the most consequential Leibnizian-metaphysical
principles for physics, he takes its legitimacy for granted in a way that she did not. More
generally, although he is obviously aware of the anti-metaphysics tendency among the
Naturlehrer, he is far less responsive than Du Châtelet was to the need to provide a
systematic apology for Leibniz’s metaphysics or at least to clarify its relation to physics.
Meanwhile, as what Hartmut Hecht claims to be an “established fact,” Du Châtelet –
besides her mentor Pierre de Maupertuis and occasional correspondent Euler – played
an instrumental role in the early developments of the exegetical approach examined in
this paper, namely that of interpreting Leibniz’s philosophy “from a natural science point
of view.”16 This approach supposedly originated in the French-speaking parts of Europe
before Du Châtelet et al. introduced it to German academic circles in the 1740s. Moreover,
her Institutions has a pioneering feature not shared by her peers’ work: if Maupertuis and
Euler were primarily concerned with specific “aspects of natural science,” she sought for
“a systematic philosophy” to underscore the best scientific practices of the day (Hecht
2012, 61–62).
Here, then, we see a most remarkable difference between Du Châtelet’s and the early
Kant’s responses to the vis viva controversy. In section 2, I presented the controversy as an
intricate philosophical affair that, from the start, involved not only specific metaphysical
issues, such as the nature of body qua the subject matter of physics, but also the very
relation between metaphysics and physics. As such, it presented later participants with
an exceptional philosophical opportunity. If Du Châtelet used the occasion to transform
Leibniz’s metaphysical system – or, perhaps more aptly, to uncover its true meaning –
and thereby accommodate it to the best physics of the day, the younger Kant (born
in 1724) was preoccupied with the technical aspects of the controversy. In this regard,
15 By one verdict, the Living Forces “consists for the most part an excruciating enumeration of flawed objections to
flawed arguments” (Schönfeld 2000, 20, with textual analysis at 36–55).
16 Euler’s contribution in this regard was a 20-page pamphlet, Gedancken von den Elementen der Cörper (1746),
which by all accounts quickly proved to be “a volley in a metaphysical battle that Euler had much to do
with initiating” (Wilson 1992, 410). It propelled intense debates not only over monadology, furthering the
Voltaire-style objection that I mentioned in section 3, but also over the larger issue of how to interpret Leibniz’s
metaphysics and its relation to physics (see Clark 1999, 438–444; Broman 2012). Kant’s Physical Monadology
(1756) is typically understood as a response to the challenges raised in Euler’s pamphlet. If so, Kant’s response
was almost a decade late – another case in point for what I am about to say at the end of this paper.
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his approach was more like Maupertuis’s and Euler’s. The remarks about (Leibniz’s)
metaphysics found here and there in the Living Forces, as I sampled them above, were still
a far cry from the systematic reflections on its meaning and validity that would define his
mature philosophy.
So, in all likelihood, neither Du Châtelet’s innovative Leibniz exegesis nor her broader
project of merging Leibnizian metaphysics and Newtonian physics got Kant’s attention
in his earliest endeavor. If he was indeed aware of certain Naturlehrer’s hostility toward
the Leibnizian-style metaphysics, we saw him mostly playing along, despite his belief
otherwise. Although the opportunity was present, he was far from ready to initiate the
grand project of redefining Leibnizian metaphysics in light of Newtonian physics that
Friedman attributed to him, a description that indeed better captures Du Châtelet’s
Institutions.
5. Conclusion
My focus in this paper was to study how Kant’s first publication related to and com-
pared with the Leibniz exegeses in its background, especially the unparalleled version
submitted by Du Châtelet.
I began by looking at the vis viva controversy behind Kant’s debut. It was a protracted
historical event that involved many important philosophical subjects on top of compli-
cated issues of mechanics. By 1740s, any serious participant in the controversy would
be confronted with not only the relevant mathematical and mechanical problems but
also certain issues fundamental to a modern philosophy of science, such as what makes a
proper scientific methodology and how to manage the relation between metaphysics and
physics. Partly for this reason, the controversy was still live when Kant entered the fray.
It presented him with an opportunity to confront the fundamental issues just mentioned
and do so in a systematic manner.
In section 3, I took my cue from Reichenberger that Du Châtelet answered the said
opportunity with a philosophical framework to bring together Leibnizianism and Newto-
nianism. I focused on how she made Leibnizian-metaphysical principles foundational to
physics. I examined her treatment of PSR in particular, positioning it vis-à-vis Voltaire’s
arguments that pitted Leibnizian and Newtonian approaches to physics against each
other.
In section 4, I overviewed Kant’s attempt to resolve the vis viva controversy. I gave
special attention to his treatment of (Leibniz’s) metaphysics, which I then compared with
Du Châtelet’s. In the final analysis, what Kant had to offer fell far short of her revolutionary
initiative to reconcile Leibnizian metaphysics and Newtonian physics.
In this way, I hope to have cleared out an interpretative space that sits between those
who have read too much into Kant’s debut and those who have thought too little of it
or basically ignored it. One take-away of my study is that Kant, who strived to be an
independent thinker from the very start of his career, had to take in the evolving lands-
cape of Leibniz exegeses on his own terms. If I was correct in suggesting that he did not
materialize the opportunity provided by the vis viva controversy to develop a systematic-
philosophical framework as Du Châtelet did, it was less a failure or lack of sophistication
on his part than an indication that his early self was preoccupied with specific issues
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within natural science. To a greater or lesser extent, the same may be said of Kant’s nu-
merous publications on natural science throughout the 1750s and in much of the 1760s.
Although he would insert suggestive philosophical reflections here and there in speciali-
zed treatises, he would not thereby disclose any resolution to construct a comprehensive
philosophical system – with, say, a reformed Leibnizian metaphysics at its foundation
and a thought-out account of scientific methodology – to go with Newtonian physics.17
This kind of construction would be a later development, during the decade or so leading
to the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), which Kant would eventually tout
as “the true apology for Leibniz” in a polemic with Eberhard, a self-branded Leibnizian
(ÜE 8: 250). Only then, having made his so-called critical turn, would he consider how his
approach to metaphysics compared with trending Leibniz exegeses at the time and decla-
re his own as the truly faithful one. Further explication of this interpretative hypothesis
is the subject of another paper.18
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